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ant's objection, received accounting evidence sponsored 
by plaintiffs using that procedure only. (Tr. 34, 110-
11). The Court rejected as a matter of law offers of 
proof duly made by defendant designed to show: 
1. The accounting procedure used by plaintiffs in 
this case is not consistent with "the accounting method 
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in 
the years prior to 1965" as required by the Amended 
Declaratory Judgment entered by the Court below in 
the prior case. 
2. The precise nature of "the accounting method 
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in 
the years prior to 1965" which was prescribed by the 
Amended Declaratory Judgment of the Court below in 
the prior case. 
3. The fact that testimony, books and records were 
available at the time of trial to compute "net profit rent-
als under the Fifty-Year Lease calculated by the ac-
counting method approved by the Lessor and utilized by 
the parties in the years prior to 1965" as prescribed by 
the Amended Declaratory Judgment heretofore entered 
by the Court below in the prior case and that plaintiffs' 
computations and extrapolations were incompetent and 
illegal. 
bered from "1-130", when in fact the proceedings were held a 
year earlier on November 14, 1973 and the pages of the trans-
cript of which are separately numbered 1-40. 
The pages of the transcript for the September, 1974 proceedings 
will be referred to in the text herein as " [ T r . . . . . ] " and those 
of the November, 1973 hearing will be specifically identified. 
* • * : • . - . v - • 3 . A - ; - , ' ^ i . :.::.•• 
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4. The amount of net profit rentals due plaintiffs 
"under the Fifty-Year Lease calculated by the account-
ing method approved by Lessor and utilized by the 
parties in the years prior to 1965" was substantially less 
than those calculated by plaintiffs. (Tr. I l l , et seq.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment of the 
Trial Court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
This case has its origin and, under the specific rul-
ings of the Trial Judge, had its finality established by 
the prior case between the same parties in the District 
Court. That former case involved the interpretation and 
application of some of the same lease agreement lan-
guage which is here involved. We will, therefore, at-
tempt to make a concise statement of the development, 
processing and disposition of the pertinent issues lead-
ing to this appeal. 
J. Genesis of this Case: 
a) Pertinent Portions of the Proceedings in 
the Prior Case. 
The "Fifty-Year Lease Agreement" (R. 287) 
Under which this controversy arose was executed on 
November 6, 1946 by the predecessors in interest to the 
parties to this litigation. Inter alia, the Lease provides 
4 
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certain Fifty-Year Lease covering a gypsum ore de-
posit at Sigurd, Utah, as construed by Order Amend-
ing Declaratory Judgment entered by the District 
Court of Sevier County on November 4, 1973.1 De-
fendant denied plaintiffs' claim and affirmatively as-
serted that plaintiffs' interpretation of the subject 
Lease Agreement, as construed by prior Judgment of 
the Court below, is erroneous as a matter of fact and as 
a matter of law. 
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT 
This matter was tried by the Court sitting without 
a jury on September 30, 1974. At the trial, the Court 
ruled as a matter of law that an opinion of the Utah 
Supreme Court2 and the Order of the District Court 
of Sevier County amending Declaratory Judgment (R. 
411) on remand from this Court, had perpetually fixed 
as the only permissible accounting method to be used 
in determining net profit royalties under the Lease, that 
procedure utilized in plaintiffs' Exhibits 139 through 
143 (R. 141, et seq.) received in evidence by the Dis-
trict Court in the prior case.3 The Court, over defend-
"i American Gypsum Trust, et al, v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 
Civil No. 6307. This action will be referred to herein as the 
former or prior case or trial. 
2 American Gypsum Trust, et al, v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 
Case No. 12887, 30 Utah 2d 6, 512 P.2d 658 (1973). 
3 It should be pointed out that the Clerk of the Court below erred 
in preparing the index to the Record on Appeal. The second 
page of the index contains two.-errors. The first indicates that 
the transcript pages of the "Proceedings held on September 30, 
1974" are separately numbered from "1-40" when in fact they 
are separately numbered from 1-130. The second indicates that 
there were "Proceedings held November 14, 1974" and that the 
pages of the transcript of such proceedings are separately num-
2 
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in paragraph Second for a tonnage royalty on "all rock 
removed from the demised premises", for a "minimum 
annual rental" and for a 7% royalty computed upon 
the "annual net profit of the Lessee". A dispute in the 
computation of the 7% net profit gave rise to the con-
troversy between the parties. The dispute was con-
trolled by paragraph Second, subparagraph E which 
reads in pertinent part: 
In addition to the payment of the rentals set out 
above in paragraphs 'A' to T) ' [tonnage and 
minimum royalties], both inclusive, the Lessee 
covenants and agrees to pay the Lessor as rent 
for said demised premises during the said de-
mised term of fifty (50) years seven (7%) per-
cent of the annual net profit of the Lessee, be-
fore deduction of Federal and State income 
taxes, but excluding from the computation of 
said annual net profits all net profits and/or 
losses of the Lessee from the manufacture, sale 
or other disposition of all materials and products 
other than raw materials taken from the demised 
premises or other than products manufactured or 
processed from such raw materials. . . . 
The Lessee and the Lessor covenant and agree 
that the net profit, aforesaid, shall be determined 
in accordance with sound accounting principles 
and practices in the gypsum industry, and Les-
see, and his assigns, agree that the business oper-
ation shall be carried on in a prudent and busi-
ness-like manner for all interests concerned. In 
the event of any disagreement between the Les-
sor and the Lessee, or his assigns, hereunder 
with respect to items of either income or deduc-
tions for determining net prof it, the parties shall 
5 
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be bound by the final determination of the Bu-
reau of Internal Revenue for Federal income 
tax purposes for the year in which the dispute 
arises. . . . 
By the terms of paragraph Fifth, the 7% royalty 
provision is made subject to an express proviso that 
"rock of the kind and quality needed can be sup-
plied . . . " from the leased premises at Sigurd, Utah. 
Following the former trial before the Court with-
out a jury, the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson entered 
judgment on March 28, 1972 in which he ruled that 
defendant had not properly computed the 7% net profit 
royalty. He then entered Judgment in the sum of 
$315,724.18 against defendant. He also entered judg-
ment declaring that during the remaining term of the 
Fifty-Year Lease, and "so long as there are mineable 
and processable reserves on the leased premises", de-
fendant : 
(a) Must operate its Sigurd plant at not less than 
a production level of 128,539,000 square feet of gypsum 
wallboard; provided that a sufficient market was avail-
able for its sale; and 
'(b) Net profit royalties must be computed "in the 
manner exemplified by plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-141 in-
clusive". (R. 33-35) 
The 128,539,000 square feet minimum production 
level listed in the declaratory part of the Judgment was 
premised upon Finding of Fact No. 27 (R. 24) in which 
6 
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Judge Erickson specifically found that defendant must 
"operate the Sigurd Plant [in the future] at not less 
than the average 1965, 1966 and 1967 production levels 
(128,539,000 square feet) . . . ^Furthermore, the same 
minimum production level was a necessary ingredient in 
Exhibits 129 through 141 (R. 141, et seq.) referred to 
in the Declaratory Judgment which also underpinned 
the computation in support of the money judgment. 
b) Pertinent Portions of the Decree of this Court 
in the prior case. 
An appeal was duly perfected by defendant from 
both the fixed damage and declaratory portions of the 
Judgment in the prior case. Defendant sought a re-
versal of the money judgment claiming, among other 
reasons, that Exhibits 139-141 were not supported by 
sufficient foundation and were inadmissible in evidence 
as a matter of law. Defendant at trial had objected to 
those exhibits upon that ground. They were received 
in evidence by the Trial Judge, over objection upon the 
ground that "plaintiffs have established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that defendant Georgia-Pacific 
Corporation has not maintained its books and records 
of account in connection with the operation of the Sig-
urd plant and the leased premises in a manner which 
will permit a proper accounting of the net profit lease 
rentals due to plaintiffs under the lease." (Para. 3 of 
Conclusions of Law in prior case; It. 28) 
One of the principal arguments made by defend-
ant before this Court in the prior appeal attacking the 
7 
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declaratory portion of the Judgment was that "Finding 
of Fact No. 27" requiring future operation of the plant 
at not less than the average 1965, 1966 and 1967 pro-
duction levels (128,539,000 square feet) was erroneous 
as a matter of law. 
The opinion of this Court in that case [R. 36; 30 
Utah 2d 6, 512 P.2d 658 (1973)] was written for the 
majority by Justice Henroid and was filed on July 16, 
1973. The Court affirmed the judgment below in the 
prior case with respect to the money judgment but 
reversed the Declaratory Judgment for prospective re-
lief to the extent founded upon Finding No. 27 (requir-
ing production at the '65-'67 levels of 128,539,000 square 
feet). In this regard, the Court stated (30 Utah 2d 
at 12;R. 39): 
The terminology of Finding 27 that the income 
under the lease would be determinable if G-P 
"has a sufficient market" in the Western market 
found by the trial court is calculated to provoke 
perennial litigation, and there is nothing in the 
lease to justify such provocation. There could 
be a market in the area, but G-P may not want 
to enter it because it might be quite unprofitable. 
The finding's fallacy is an interdiction to use a 
market in the area if there is one. All we can 
glean out of the lease is that if there is, G-P 
and/or its subsidiaries or other agency under its 
direct or indirect control, or its successors, 
choose to enter and make sales in it, there is a 
duty absolute to use Sigurd ore and pay tribute 
to the Lessor according to the leasehold's terms 
as stated above. So being, Finding 27 is held 
8 
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to be not only irrelevant to the facts, but irrever-
ant to the leasehold. 
Our conclusion as to Finding 27, therefore, is 
that it is not supported by the wording of the 
requirements of the lease or the facts, as to either 
of its two facets. 
Considering the decision by its four corners, the 
Court sustained the money judgment which was prem-
ised in major part upon Finding No. 27 but reversed 
that portion of the Declaratory Judgment for future 
relief founded upon that Finding and remanded the 
matter to the District Court for further proceedings 
to amend the Declaratory Judgment consistent with the 
Court's opinion. The author judge, in explaining why 
this ruling was not internally inconsistent, stated (30 
Utah 2d at 13; R. 40): 
We conclude that the money judgment of the 
trial court be and it hereby is affirmed, as is the 
rest thereof, including that portion sustaining 
the accounting procedure reflected in Exhibits 
139-141, but excepting that portion of the 're-
quirements' portion of the lease discussed here-
inabove. That part is reversed with instructions 
to modify the same in consonance with the obser-
V vations and opinions stated here. 
With respect to the use of the years 1965-7 [as 
provided in Finding No. 27] as a basis for the 
money judgment, we think that because of evi-
dence reasonably showing inaccessability of rec-
ords under the discovery process, the trial court, 
using available, admissible evidence, fairly ap-
praised the situation as to amounts due under 
the lease, — possibly even in defendant's favor, 
9 
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as not to have been unsupported by past records, 
but conservative and just to both sides of this 
case. 
Hence, it follows that this Court specifically af-
firmed the findings and conclusions of Judge Erick-
son to the effect that Exhibits 139-141 were admissible 
for the computation of money damages only because 
of the "inaccessibility of records" (emphasis added) 
made available "under the discovery process". Accord-
ingly, the money judgment was affirmed although nec-
essarily grounded upon Exhibits 139-141. However, 
the Declaratory Judgment, also grounded in the Trial 
Court upon Exhibits 139-141, was reversed and re-
manded with instruction to modify the same in conso-
nance with the observation and opinion of this Court. 
Parenthetically, we note that the interpretation 
placed by the Court below upon this Court's opinion in 
the prior case demonstrates that the "perennial litiga-
tion" sought to be avoided in Judge Henroid's opinion 
is the very product of that opinion. 
c) The Proceedings on Bern and: 
1) Plaintiffs" Motion to Modify Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment. 
After remand by this Court, plaintiffs filed in the 
Trial Court a "Motion to Modify Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pursuant to 
Opinion and Order of the Supreme Court of the State 
of LTtah". (R. 416) That motion, as here pertinent, in-
10 
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Following the Court's pronouncement, plaintiffs 
called their only witness, an accountant, Mr. Grant 
Caldwell. (Tr. 42) He testified that he had been en-
gaged by plaintiffs to compute the 7% net profit roy-
alty for the years 1971 through 1973 in the same manner 
and to the extent possible "identical" with the pro-
cedures used in the prior case in preparing Exhibits 139 
through 143. (Tr. 49) He carried out that assignment 
and his work product was received in evidence over ob-
jection as Exhibits 129A through 148A. (Id.) 
In preparing these accounting exhibits, Mr. Cald-
well relied upon the same foundational assumptions of 
fact relied upon in the prior case, as well as additional 
assumptions equally unfounded. The assumptions in 
the prior case, as stated at pages 44 and 57 of Appel-
lant's Brief to this Court are: 
a) That the price decline in the Sigurd plant West-
ern market area was caused solely by Appellant in its 
operation of the Lovell, Wyoming and Acme, Texas 
plants (which were not embraced by the Fifty-Year 
Lease Agreement and were not operated by the Lessee 
at the time the same was executed), and 
b) That the Sigurd plant should have experienced 
profit levels in 1965-70 (1971-73 in the present case) 
equal to prof it levels of 1962-64, and 
c) That gypsum products could have been sold 
on the West Coast at the same profit levels in the years 
1965-70 (1971-73 in the present case) as in the years 
1962,1963 and 1964, and 
15 
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d) That during the years 1967-68 (1971-73 in the 
present case), the Sigurd plant could have produced at 
the 1967 production level and at the same profit level 
as reached in the years 1962-64. 
In connection with his accounting testimony, Mr. 
Caldwell admitted: 
a) That his expertise was in the field of account-
ing, not economics or marketing. (Tr. 77-78) 
b) That in applying his assumptions and prepar-
ing his accounting exhibits, he had taken the highest 
production years reflected by records available to him 
(1965-1967) (Tr. 80) and the highest profit years re-
flected by the records available to him (1962-1964) (Tr. 
78) and had utilized the same as the base for the 1971-
73 accounting period. Hence, in extrapolating his fig-
ures, he ignored wholly the actual cost and profit records 
which were available to him, but seized upon and used 
for his computations the highest production level (1967) 
and the highest profit level (1962-64) the Sigurd plant 
had experienced in more than 25 years of operation. 
(Tr. 105). And he did this without having performed 
any studies as to economic and marketing factors in the 
market place for the years being considered. (Tr. 77) 
c) That accounting records were available to him 
from which the per unit costs of production for years 
1971 through 1973 could be computed. He also had 
available to him records from which the sales price to 
all customers could be determined for the entire Sigurd 
16 
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(R. 7) The prayer of the complaint, accordingly and 
incorrectly, sought an accounting to determine the 
amount due on that unfounded theory and for judg-
ment in that amount. Defendant, by its Answer (It. 
73), generally denied and thereby placed in issue plain-
tiffs' erroneous allegation that the 7% royalty must, 
or indeed may, be computed for years 1971-73 on the 
basis of those exhibits submitted in the prior case. Trial 
thereon was conducted by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
on September 30, 1974. The judgment appealed from 
was entered by him on November 15, 1974. (It. 106) 
3. Evidence presented by Plaintiffs and Received 
by the Court over Defendant's Objections. 
The trial proceedings started and finished on the 
mistaken note that the Trial Judge's rulings were ab-
solutely fixed and controlled by the opinion of this 
Court in the prior case and that Trial Judge was 
bound by the opinion of this Court to look only to the 
"manner exemplified in plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-143" 
in the prior case for the computation of 7% net profit 
royalties. Defendant insisted below, and we assert here, 
that the Trial Judge misinterpreted the opinion of this 
Court in the prior case. At the end of the opening states 
ments of the parties, the Court below stated the follow-
ing from the bench (It .34): 
[ I ] f s my understanding that I should look to the 
manner of accounting as set forth in those three 
exhibits [Exhibits 139-143] and that's what I'm 
going to do and so if it is a matter of law, we 
will decide that right now and it is decided. 
14 
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us by way of declaratory was that the method 
utilized prior to 1965 was the one that is proper 
under the lease. [Emphasis added] 
4) Declaratory Judgment entered by the court be-
low on remand. 
On November 14, 1973, the Court signed the sub-
stituted "Order Modifying Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment" (R. 411) prepared by plaintiffs incorpor-
ating the concept contained in Mr. McCarthy's lang-
uage quoted immediately above. That order provided, 
inter alia, that defendant's duty to make sales of gypsum 
products from the Lessor's mining properties was sub-
ject to the condition that "rock of the hind and quality 
needed can be supplied from the Leased Premises . . / ' 
(Emphasis added) as requested by defendant. (R. 
413) I t further provided that the 7% net royalty pro-
vision in the future must be calculated by the account-
ing "method approved by the Lessor and utilized by 
the parties in the years prior to 1965." (R. 415; em-
phasis added) 
2. The Filing of the Instant Action. 
The complaint (R. 1) fostering this appeal was 
filed in the District Court of Sevier County on June 7, 
1974. The complaint erroneously alleged, contrary to 
the express terms of the aforementioned modified Order 
dated November 14, 1973 (R. 415), that 7% net royal-
ties for calqendar years 1971, 1972 and 1973 must be 
computed under the method "exemplified in Exhibits 
139 through 143, received in evidence in the prior case". 
13 
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itially and improperly proposed that Finding of Fact 
No. 27, Conclusion of Law No. 8 and Judgment each be 
amended to require future computations of net profit 
rentals under the Fifty-Year Lease to be made "in the 
manner exemplified in plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-143, in-
clusive . . . " (Id.) 
Hence, initially the principal thrust of plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend was to attempt to fix perpetually 
as the only and proper accounting procedure, as did 
Judge Erickson's Judgment which was reversed and 
remanded by this Court, that method reflected by Ex-
hibits 139-143 as used in the prior trial. 
2) Defendant's response to Motion to Amend Find-
ings, Conclusions and Judgment. 
Defendant thereupon duly filed its "Objections to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment". (R. 422) In 
those objections, defendant pointed out that plaintiffs' 
proposed modifications would be inconsistent both with 
(1) the clear, unambiguous and uncontroverted pro-
visions of the Lease Agreement and with (2) the de-
cision of the majority of the Supreme Court. Accord-
ingly, defendant moved that the Trial Court delete 
completely all reference to Exhibits 139 through 143 
and to add specifically two provisions which defendant 
contended were necessary to "modify" the judgment "in 
conconance' with the provisions of the lease itself and 
the "observations and opinions" stated in the Supreme 
Court decision. Those changes were: 
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(a) Insertion of the following language as a pro-
viso: "provided that rock of the kind and quality needed 
can be supplied from the leased premises." 
(b) Adding, in lieu of the language to be deleted 
relating to prior Exhibits 139-143, a requirement that 
the 7% net profit royalties be computed in the "manner 
utilized by the parties in years prior to 1965." 
3) Hearing on plaintiffs' Motions to Modify 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. 
At the hearing on November 14, 1973 on plaintiffs' 
Motion to Modify and defendant's objections thereto, 
plaintiffs withdrew their proposed modifications and 
accepted conceptually those of defendant's objections 
discussed above. Plaintiffs consented to adding the fol-
lowing proviso: "provided rock of the kind and quality 
needed can be supplied from the Lessor's mining prop-
erties." Plaintiffs also consented to and actually pro-
posed, as defendant had done in its objections, the dele-
tion of reference to Exhibits 139-143 and a substitution 
in lieu thereof of language requiring computation of 
the 7% net royalty "by the accounting method ap-
proved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in the 
years prior to 1965." (Emphasis added) 
In so doing, Dennis McCarthy, Esq., one of coun-
sel for plaintiffs, admitted at page 6 of the transcript 
of that hearing that: 
/ think the principle i* correctly recognized by 
the defendant that what in effect the court gave 
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marketing area for each of the years in question. But, 
these he rejected in favor of his hypothesis. (Tr. 86-
87) 
d) That he did not take into consideration the 
Federally imposed price freeze during years 1971 
through 1973. (Tr. 90) 
e) That he further assumed that per unit costs 
were the same in 1971-73 as in the years 1962-64. (Tr. 
89-90) 
f) That he assumed that the "Acme", Texas plant 
was selling gypsum products in the "Sigurd marketing 
area"4 in years 1971-73. (Tr. 84) 
Defendant asserted below and argues herein that 
this "evidence" was inadmissible and should not have 
been received. 
4. Evidence Proffered by Defendant but Rejected 
by the Court. 
After plaintiffs rested, defendant made the fol-
lowing proffer of proof which it asserted could be 
proven at this trial. The Trial Court accepted the 
proffer but refused to consider the evidence proffered. 
(Tr. 110) 
4 The "Sigurd marketing area", not referred to in the Fifty-Year 
Lease Agreement, but defined in the original Judgment entered 
by Judge Erickson and affirmed in the majority opinion of this 
Court, is the area occupied by "California, Oregon, Washington, 
Nevada, Idaho, Utah, Western Montana, Western Wyoming and 
Western Colorado." 
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Mr. Fred Oliver, a Certified Public Accountant 
and partner in Haskins & Sells, a National accounting 
firm, would be called as a witness and he would testify 
as follows: (Tr. 108, et seq.) 
a) That he had been retained by defendants to re-
view the Lease language and the Declaratory Judgment 
entered in the prior case, together with the Supreme 
Court opinion in the prior case, and to determine there-
from the proper accounting methods to be utilized and 
the net profit royalties, if any, due to plaintiffs for 
calendar years 1971-73. 
b) That in the course of this assignment, he had 
examined plaintiffs' accounting exhibits, received in 
evidence by the Court and that the same were not pre-
pared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
procedures as required by the Lease and were not in 
conformance with the Declaratory Judgment of the 
District Court in the prior case because they did not: 
(1) utilize available actual production records for 
the years in which the royalties were computed; 
(2) utilize available records showing actual costs 
for the years in which the calculation was 
made; 
(3) utilize available records showing actual sales 
prices to the end customer in the years for 
which the computation was made; 
(4) consider the available evidence indicating the 
amount of ore reserves. (Tr. 111-112) 
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c) That each of the assumptions of fact relied upon 
by plaintiffs' witness Caldwell to support his conclu-
sions was not a proper accounting assumption. (Tr. 
112) 
d) That sound accounting principles, and the pro-
visions of the amended Declaratory Judgment, require 
the use of actual data, which was available and examined 
by the witness, for the years in question in computing 
net royalty profits for calendar years 1971, 1972 and 
1973 and that the computations made by plaintiffs' wit-
ness Caldwell were improper projections and extrapola-
tions based upon profit margins in other years and 
grounded upon unrelated and unreliable assumed data. 
(Tr. 113) 
e) That accounting records were available to make 
actual computations, without projections or extrapola-
tions from prior operations, of profit royalties due in 
the years in question following meticulously the ac-
counting procedures approved by the Lessor and utilized 
by the parties prior to 1965. (Tr. 113-114) 
f) That the actual amount of net profit royalty 
due if production were to be limited to actual production 
at the Sigurd plant during calendar years 1971-73 is 
$161,597 (R. 369; Def. Ex. C) . 
g) That the amount of net profit royalty due if all 
sales in the historic Sigurd market area were to be con-
sidered, taking into account the depletion of ore avail-
able at Sigurd for the manufacture of all gypsum prod-
ucts involved is $247,157. (R. 364; Def. Ex. C) . 
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h) That accounting exhibits, which were offered 
but rejected by the Court, showed the proper compu-
tation of net profit royalties under the assumptions 
made in the next preceding two paragraphs. (Tr.- 113; 
Def .Ex. C). 
By way of additional facts to support Mr. Oliver's 
accounting testimony and exhibits, defendant would 
call as witnesses the quarry superintendent for the Sig-
urd plant, the plant engineer for the Sigurd plant, the 
quarry and maintenance superintendent for the com-
petitive and contiguous United States Gypsum Com-
pany plant, the production superintendent for Georgia-
Pacific Corporation who also served as a United Na-
tions consultant on gypsum reserves, and independent 
consultant H . J . VanderVeer of H . J . VanderVeer & 
Associates, Consulting Engineers and Geologists, Salt 
Lake City, each of whom would testify that as of Aug-
ust 31, 1974, estimated reserves of the kind and quality 
of rock required to manufacture gypsum products from 
the leased premises were approximately 58,420 tons, with 
a stockpile of ore of 21,033 tons, which amounts of ore 
would be depleted in a few months from the date of 
trial. (Tr. 107-108) 
Mr. Glenn Wilson, Vice-President of Georgia-
Pacific Corporation, in charge of all gypsum operations, 
if permitted to testify, would state. (Tr. 100-106): 
a) That contrary to Caldwell's testimony, per unit 
costs for the manufacture of gypsum wallboard did not 
remain constant from the base years utilized by Cald-
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
well (1962-64) to the years 1971-73; that per unit costs 
increased in excess of $3.00 per 1,000 square feet be-
tween those periods which, alone, would have resulted 
in a profit decline of $400,000 per year and a net royalty 
decline of $28,000 per year; that Federal price controls 
and freezes were in effect during the calendar years in 
question and throughout virtually all of the period in-
volved (1971-73), which prevented defendant from fol-
lowing the pricing trends incorrectly assumed by Cald-
well ; 
b) That the base years, 1962-64, utilized by Cald-
well to determine "profit margin" were the most profit-
able years in the entire history of the Sigurd plant and 
that the years 1965 through 1967, assumed by Caldwell 
as his production base, were the highest volume of pro-
duction in the history of the Sigurd plant. 
c) That during years 1971-73, defendant's Acme 
plant did not sell gypsum products in the "historic 
market area" of the Sigurd plant as defined in the Dec-
laratory Judgment and thus could not have acted to 
depress the market price of gypsum wallboard, con-
trary to the assumption of Mr. Caldwell. (Tr. 102-03) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RUL-
ING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE 
ONLY PERMISSIBLE ACCOUNTING METH-
OD TO BE USED IN DETERMINING NET 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P R O F I T R O Y A L T I E S U N D E R T H E L E A S E 
WAS T H E P R O C E D U R E U T I L I Z E D I N E X -
H I B I T S 139 T H R O U G H 143 IN T H E P R I O R 
CASE. 
This appeal turns upon whether or not defendant 
breached the provisions of a Fifty-Year Lease (R. 
287) in computing lease royalty payments for calendar 
years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The Lease itself, together 
with an amended Declaratory Judgment (R. 411) in-
terpreting certain of its provisions, were before the 
Court below. However, rather than to afford to the 
Lease language, and to the language of the amended 
Declaratory Judgment their plain meaning, the Court 
below erroneously seized upon language contained in 
the opinion of this Court entered in the prior litigation 
between the parties as mandating a sole, perpetual and 
arbitrary method of computing royalties. This method 
is contrary to the Lease provisions and to the amended 
Declaratory Judgment. In this regard, the Court be-
low erroneously ruled, at the close of opening state-
ments at page 34 of the transcript: 
[I] t ' s my understanding that I should look to the 
manner of accounting as set forth in those three 
or four exhibits [Exhibits 139-143] and that's 
what I'm going to do and so if it is a matter of 
law, we will decide that right now and it is 
decided. 
_;•-—•• In this argument, we shall first discuss and show 
the clarity and unambiguity of the provisions of the 
Lease and of the amended Declaratory Judgment. If 
this Court should find ambiguity in the language of 
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either the Lease or the amended Declaratory Judgment, 
we submit that such ambiguity should be resolved by 
looking to the admissions of plaintiffs below; and fur-
ther that plaintiffs are estopped by their action below 
from here rejecting the very language which they spon-
sored. Finally, we will argue that the amendments made 
to the Declaratory Judgment, on remand, by the Court 
below are consistent with the prior opinion of this Court. 
1. The Language of the Lease: 
The lease provides in pertinent part (P. Ex. 1-A, 
p . 7 ; R . 293): 
The Lessee and Lessor covenant and agree that 
the net profit, aforesaid, shall be determined in 
accordance with sound accounting principles and 
practices in the gypsum industry, and lessee, and 
his assigns, agree that the business operations 
shall be carried on in a prudent and businesslike 
manner for all interests concerned. [Emphasis 
added] 
I t appears to us that this particular language is 
free from ambiguity. It follows that the same binds 
the parties according to the plain meaning of the words 
which they chose to govern their relationship. This rule 
is clearly enunciated in Bryant v. Deseret News Pub. 
Co., 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951) as follows: 
Plaintiff also invokes the rule of interpretation 
that doubtful, ambiguous terms in a contract 
should be interpreted against the party who has 
chosen the terms. 12 Am. Jur., Sections 250 and 
252. We agree that these rules of construction 
should be considered in determining what is a 
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reasonable and fair interpretation of the inten-
tion of the parties. However, if the language is 
clear and is not susceptible of more than one in-
terpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the 
words must be used.[Emphasis added] 
This language also binds the Court for it may not 
substitute its notions for the bargain negotiated by the 
parties without running afoul of the constitutional guar-
antees which are discussed below. We also note, paren-
thetically, as shown in the appeal to this Court of the 
prior case, that the "terms" of the agreement here were 
those enunciated by plaintiffs' attorney Willis W. Hit-
ter who acted as the scrivener and who also acted as a 
long-time trustee of the plaintiff trust. I t follows that 
any arguable ambiguity in the lease language must be 
interpreted against the interests of the plaintiffs. 
I t should be noted that this language was not 
amended by the original Judgment in the prior case, 
by this Court's decision or by the Order on Remand 
amending the Judgment. The language stands. I t binds 
the Court and the parties. 
I t follows that the Court below committed griev-
ous error for it refused to receive or consider competent 
testimony that plaintiffs' accounting was not "in ac-
cordance with sound accounting principles and prac-
tices" for the particular years in question. The Trial 
Court further erred by refusing to receive or consider 
competent testimony showing that royalties as com-
puted by defendant were "in accordance with sound 
accounting principles and practices." 
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Hence, the Court below accepted plaintiffs' ver-
sion of hotly contested facts, wholly refusing to con-
sider defendant's evidence. This action is tantamount 
to the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment in 
the presence of genuine issues of fact. The rule of law 
here applicable has been restated many times by this 
Court. Illustrative is this Court's opinion found in 
Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 187, 
506 P.2d 1274,1276 (1973) : 
The fundamental controlling rule in this case is 
that summary judgment should be granted only 
when it clearly appears that there are no issues 
of material fact in dispute which if resolved in 
favor of the adverse par ty would entitle him to 
prevail. Applying that rule to what we have said 
herein it is our opinion that there should be a 
plenary trial and resolution of all of the issues 
tendered by the parties to this lawsuit. I t is re-
manded for that purpose. Costs to defendant 
(appellant) . [Footnote omitted] 
I t follows that the Judgment must be reversed. 
2. The Language of the Order Amending the Dec-
lavatory Judgment on Remand. 
On remand from this Court, the Court below en-
tered its Order amending the Declaratory Judgment . 
The pertinent language from that Order reads (R. 
415) : 
4. That the Court hereby declares that until the 
Fifty Year Lease between the parties, which is 
hereby found to be valid, subsisting and binding 
in accordance with its terms, expires, and so long 
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as there is rock of the kind and quality needed 
on the Leased Premises therein described, de-
fendant Georgia-Pacific Corporation and/or its 
subsidiaries and controlled agencies shall (a)"if 
they choose to enter and make sales of gypsum 
products in the historic Sigurd Plant market area 
as defined in modified Finding of Fact No. 27 
herein, then all such products sold in said area 
must be manufactured with gypsum ore taken 
from the Leased Premises; and (b) shall com-
pute and pay to plaintiffs net profit rentals as 
provided in the Fifty Year Lease by the method 
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the 
parties in the years prior to 1965. [Emphasis 
added] 
We assert that this language likewise is free from 
uncertainty or ambiguity and, for the same reasons, 
binds the parties and the Court. Furthermore, this clear 
language binds the parties and the Court under the doc-
trine of res ad judicata. In support of this contention, 
we quote from Tiff any Productions, Inc., Limited, et 
al v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 
et at, 22 P.2d 275, 276 (Cal. App. 1933) : 
Somewhat reduced in form, the second question 
propounded by the petitioner herein in substance 
is whether the ruling by the court on the first 
motion to increase the amount of the undertaking 
;. was res adjudicata. If it was, of course, it should 
follow the ordinary rule obtainable with reference 
to judgments; that is to say, that the court therer-
after had no authority by its order either to 
modify, or to reverse the former order made by 
it, In other words, if the first order in question 
.. ranked as a judgment, the court thereafter was 
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unauthorized to disturb it in the manner or by 
the method adopted by the defendant for that 
purpose. And although disaffirming any inten-
tion to accurately define what is meant by the 
expression 'res adjudicata,' as a starting point 
for ensuing observations it may be assumed that 
included within the boundaries of a complete ex-
position of the significance which properly may 
be ascribed to the term is the general doctrine 
that in any action or proceeding an issuable fact 
once legally decided therein is thereafter beyond 
dispute as between or among the parties either in 
that or in any other action or proceeding in which 
the same parties or their respective privies may 
be litigants. (Emphasis added) 
The language of the amended Judgment (R. 415) 
specifically imposes the following three constraints: 
a) The accounting procedure must consider all 
sales by defendant "in the historic Sigurd market area'3 
Plaintiffs' evidence, received over objection, ad-
mittedly does not consider all of such sales. Instead, 
plaintiffs' accounting is premised upon only the sale of 
128,539,000 square feet in each year, relying upon Judge 
JErickson's original Finding No. 27 which compelled 
production at that level. One need only to look to the 
prior opinion of this Court (30 Utah 2d 6; R. 36) to 
show that this approach is erroneous. In that opinion, 
plaintiffs' foundational Finding No. 27 (128,539,000 
square feet) was reversed with instructions to the Trial 
Court to amend the same on remand. In reversing, 
Justice Henroid stated: "So being, Finding 27 is held 
to be not only irrelevant to the facts, but irreverani to 
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the leasehold." (30 Utah 2d at 12; R. 39; emphasis 
added). 
But to add insult to injury, the Court below, after 
having erroneously received this evidence, proceeded 
erroneously to refuse to consider competent testimony 
proffered by defendant to account for all "sales of gyp-
sum products in the historic Sigurd market area" dur-
ing 1971,1972 and 1973. (Tr. 110) 
• • • - \ 
This requirement that only Sigurd ore be sold in 
the Sigurd historical marketing area raises a practical 
problem as shown by defendant's proffer of proof. A 
substantial portion of the gypsum products sold by de-
fendant in Sigurd's historical marketing area during the 
years 1971 through 1973 came from Lovell rather than 
from Sigurd ore. Defendant was not constrained to 
limit its sales in the Sigurd historical market to products 
made from Sigurd ore until the entry of the final 
Amended Judgment in November of 1973, near the 
close (£fthe accounting period involved. To conform to 
the objective of the language of paragraph 4 of the 
Declaratory Judgment, as amended, since it was im-
possible for defendant to conform to it literally, de-
fendant proposed as one alternative in its offer of proof 
that plaintiffs be paid a royalty upon all gypsum prod-
ucts sold in the Sigurd historical marketing area re-
pardless of the source of the ore from which the products 
were produced. (Def. Ex. C) 
The use of this alternative requires review of ore 
reserves available at Sigurd. This is true, as noted be-. 
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low, because both the Lease itself and the Declaratory 
Judgment condition defendant's duty upon availability 
of rock at Sigurd of the kind and quality needed. De-
fendant's offer of proof demonstrated that there were 
not sufficient reserves of "rock of the kind and quality 
needed" in the Leased Premises to produce at Sigurd 
all of the gypsum products sold in the Sigurd marketing 
area during the accounting period under study. There-
fore, in defendant's Exhibit C, offered but rejected by 
the Court below, net profit royalties are limited to those 
that could have been generated by available ores at 
Sigurd. 
For these reasons, the Trial Court erred both in 
admitting plaintiffs' evidence, based as it is wholly upon 
the Finding 27 level of production, and in excluding ac-
counting evidence embracing all sales in the historic 
Sigurd market area, for which, according to the prior 
opinion of this Court, defendant must "pay tribute". 
(30 Utah 2d at 12; R. 39) Accordingly, the Judgment 
should be reversed for this reason alone. 
b) Defendant's duty to pay net profit royalties is 
expressly conditioned upon the availability "in the 
Leased Premises" of "rock of the hind and quality 
needed" 
As quoted above, plaintiffs ignored this provision 
of the Declaratory Judgment (R. 415) and objected 
to evidence offered by defendant to show that there was 
not sufficient "rock of the kind and quality needed on 
the Leased Premises" to manufacture all of the gypsum 
products sold in the "historic Sigurd plant market area" 
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during years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The Court below 
erroneously sustained this objection and refused to ad-
mit any evidence at all on this subject. This error alone 
requires reversal. 
c) The "net profit rentals" were required to be 
computed "by the method approved by the Lessor and 
utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965". 
The accounting evidence offered by plaintiffs and 
received by the Court over defendant's objection, admit-
tedly was not in accordance with this language. This 
evidence is grounded upon a production level never 
achieved prior to 1965, is not computed from actual 
available cost and sales records for the years in question 
as was "utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965"; 
instead it relies upon production and sales from plants 
in Lovell, Wyoming and Acme, Texas that were not 
even in existence prior to 1965, and is based upon num-
erous assumptions and extrapolations never known to 
or "utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965". As 
we argue in more detail below, the Court erred in even 
admitting the evidence of plaintiffs. 
But, a more serious error was the Court's rejection 
of the testimony of Mr. Fred Oliver, Managing partner 
of the accounting firm, Haskins & Sells, in Utah: 
a) showing the precise nature of the accounting 
method approved by the Lessor and utilized 
by the parties in the years prior to 1965; 
b) showing that actual records are available for 
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years 1971, 1972 and 1973 from which the 
net royalties can be computed in the precise 
manner "approved by the Lessor and utilized 
by the parties in the years prior to 1965"; 
c) showing that plaintiffs' accounting does not 
follow that required "method"; 
d) showing the amount of net royalties due util-
izing that required "method". (Tr. 108, et 
seq.) 
This proffered evidence was relevant, and indeed 
required, to make Findings under the concise language 
of the amended Declaratory Judgment. The Court's 
error in rejecting this evidence alone requires reversal. 
3. The Admissions of Plaintiffs Below. 
Even assuming arguendo some ambiguity or un-
certainty in the language of the Lease or of the amended 
Declaratory Judgment, the plaintiffs are in no position 
to avoid or explain away the same and rely on proving 
their case by reference to the first trial or to this Court's 
prior opinion. In that connection, the record shows that 
after the remand by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs ini-
tially filed in the Trial Court a "Motion to Modify Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, 
pursuant to Opinion and Order of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah". (R. 416) That motion, as here 
pertinent, erroneously proposed that Finding of Fact 
No. 27, Conclusion of Law No. 8 and Judgment each 
be amended to require future computations of net profit 
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rentals under the Lease as follows: "in the manner ex-
emplified in plaintiff s' Exhibits 139-143, inclusive 
(R. 420) Hence, the principal thrust of plaintiffs' orig-
inal-"Motion to Amend" was to fix perpetually as the 
only proper accounting procedure, that method reflected 
by Exhibits 139-143 used in the first trial. 
Defendant duly filed its Objections to Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Modify Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment. (R. 422) Defendant pointed out 
therein that plaintiffs' proposed modifications would 
be inconsistent both with the clear, unambiguous and un-
controverted provisions of the Lease Agreement and 
with the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court. 
Defendant specifically moved that the Trial Court de-
lete completely all reference to Exhibits 139 through 
143 and add two provisions which defendant con-
tended were necessary to make the proposed modifica-
tions of the judgment consistent with the provisions of 
the Lease itself and the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court. Those changes were: 
a) Insertion of the following language as a pro-
viso : "provided that rock of the kind and quality needed 
can be supplied from the leased premises". (Emphasis 
added) This language was obviously mandatory be-
cause of the provisions of the lease and the language of 
the majority opinion. 
b) Adding, in lieu of the language to be deleted 
relating to prior Exhibits 139-143, a requirement that 
the 7% net profit royalties be computed in the "manner 
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utilized by the parties in years prior to 1965". (R. 422, 
et seq.; emphasis added) This change was obviously 
required to conform with the clear language of the lease 
and the reversal of Finding No. 27 by this Court and the 
instructions of this Court on remand. 
At the hearing on plaintiffs' Motion to Modify and 
defendant's objections thereto, plaintiffs withdrew their 
proposed initial modifications and accepted conceptually 
those of defendant's objections which are stated above. 
In that connection, plaintiffs consented to, and indeed 
proposed, the adding of the following proviso: "pro-
vided rock of the kind and quality needed can be sup-
plied from the Lessor's mining properties." They also 
consented to and actually proposed at the hearing to 
amend the Judgment of Judge Erickson on November 
14, 1973 the deletion of reference to Exhibits 139-143 
and a substitution in lieu thereof of language requiring 
computation of the 7% net royalty "by the accounting 
method approved by the Lessor and utilized by the 
parties in the years prior to 1965" (Emphasis added) 
In so doing, Dennis McCarthy, Esq., one of coun-
sel for plaintiffs, stated in pertinent part at pages 5, et 
seq. of the transcript of the November, 1973 hearing: 
Now, your Honor, this [the original Motion to 
Amend Findings, Conclusions and Judgment] 
represented my best effort when I wrote this 
motion, but after I reviewed the objections of 
the defendant on this Finding 27, they suggested 
number one of course, we're not entitled to any-
thing as far as Finding 27 is concerned. Then 
they say even assuming arguendo — 
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Reading from their objections . . . 
— proposed by plaintiff it's appropriate the last 
two lines thereof must be deleted and the follow-
ing language substituted in lieu of. "Method 
utilized by the parties in the year prior to 1965" 
—and that your Honor , of course, eliminates the 
reference to the particular exhibit which the court 
based its damage calculations on; and the justifi-
cations for using those exhibits of course was that 
from the records of Georgia-Pacific that were 
supplied to us, they took the lease over in 1965. 
F r o m the records they supplied to us it was im-
possible to make a calculation so we had to do an 
extrapolation as to how he could arrive or as to 
what method of accounting would be utilized. 
W h a t was the method in effect prior to 1965, but 
rather than argue with the defendant about this 
particular thing, I have proposed to in substance 
adopt their suggestion and in a proposed order 
which I had prepared for the court, I have made 
a change in Finding 27 on the bottom by put t ing 
the change in in accordance with their suggestions, 
calculated by the accounting method approved 
by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in the 
years prior to 1965. 
Now, it may be that the records they have will 
not allow such a calculation, and if so, I suppose 
we'll have to go to some sort of an extrapolation 
exhibit, such as was contained in Exhibits 139 
and 143, but at least I think the principle is cor-
rectly recognized by the defendant that what in 
effect the court gave us by way of declaratory 
was that the method utilized prior to 1965 was 
the one that is proper under the lease/' [Empha-
sis added] 
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The complaint fostering the instant appeal was 
filed on June 7, 1974. In the complaint and at the trial 
below, plaintiffs renewed their attempt, abandoned on 
the record below, to fix as the only proper accounting 
procedures, that accounting method reflected by Ex-
hibits 139-143 used in the prior trial. The Trial Court's 
action in the latter trial in adopting plaintiffs' conten-
tions in this regard is contrary to the generally accepted 
rule of law enunciated as follows in 2 A L R 2d at page 
546: 
As a general proposition, a judgment entered by 
agreement or consent is as conclusive on matters 
in issue as one rendered after contest and trial, 
and is binding in a subsequent suit insofar as it 
has relevancy to the matters in issue which are 
substantially identical with those adjudicated by 
the former judgment. 
Cases which follow this generally accepted rule are 
numerous but we have elected to cite only one in-
volving Utah litigants. In Bergeson v. Life Insur-
ance Corp. of America, 265 F.2d 227, 235 (10th Cir. 
1959), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had this to 
say: . 
Defendant Pugsley asserts the defense of res ad-
judicata and obtained a summary judgment in 
his favor. The basis of his defense is a judgment 
of dismissal entered on stipulation of counsel by 
a Utah court on March 7,' 1957, dismissing an 
action brought by Pugsley against the company 
to recover unpaid director's fees. The judgment 
stated that the action, 'together with any possible 
counterclaims relating thereto/ was dismissed 
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with prejudice. . . . The point is of no avail as the 
state court unquestionably had jurisdiction of 
the parties and of the subject matter and had 
power to enter the judgment which it did. A 
judgment of dismissal pursuant to a stipulated 
settlement is ordinarily a judgment on the merits 
barring another action for the same cause. No 
suggestion is made of fraud or collusion. What-
ever claim there may be of lack of corporate 
power in the absence of stockholder action should 
be addressed to the Utah court. At the most it 
is a collateral attack on the judgment which may 
not be made here." [Emphasis added, citations 
omitted] 
Plaintiffs here consented to, indeed affirmatively 
sponsored, the language of the amended Declaratory 
Judgment which they now find to be offensive because 
it would bar their recovery. Nonetheless, they are bound 
thereby and should not be permitted to prosper by the 
attempt here to reinstate their previously abandoned 
concept. To do so would permit them to escape from 
the judgment to which they consented and would violate 
the doctrine of estoppel as recognized by this Court. In 
Migliacco v. Davis, et al, 120 Utah 1, 232 P.2d 195 
(1951), this Court paid its respect to this doctrine by 
placing its imprimatur on a rule stated in American 
Jurisprudence. There the Court stated at page 8 of 
the Utah Reporter: 
«# * * Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is 
the principal by which a party who knows or 
should know the truth is absolutely precluded, 
both at law and in equity, from denying or assert-
ing the contrary of, any material fact, which, by 
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his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, in-
tentionally or through culpable negligence, he 
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant 
of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon 
such words and conduct, to believe and act upon 
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be 
anticipated, changing his position in such a way 
that he would suffer injury if such denial or con-
trary assertion were allowed." 
Application of this doctrine to the facts of this 
case would preclude plaintiffs from now reasserting and 
the Trial Court from holding that Exhibits 139-143 are 
the sole permissible method of royalty computation after 
defendant relied upon the complete abandonment by 
plaintiffs of that concept in the Court below. The Judg-
ment should therefore, be reversed. 
4. The Prior Opinion of this Court is Consistent 
with the Amendments to the Declaratory Judgment on 
Remand and with the Position of Defendant Asserted 
Herein. 
The prior opinion of this Court does not hold that 
the sole and perpetual method of computing future net 
lease royalties is that used in preparing Exhibits 139-
143 in the prior case. Indeed, the contrary is true. This 
is so because the original Finding No. 27 (admittedly 
essential to make the royalty computations under the 
Exhibit 139-143 methodology) was rejected by this 
Court as being "not only irrelevant to the facts but ir-
reverent to the leasehold". This Court further stated 
in reversing as to Finding 27 (30 Utah 2d at 12; R. 39) : 
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Our Conclusion as to Finding 27, therefore, is 
that it is not supported by the wording of the 
requirements of the lease or the facts, as to either 
of its two facets. 
This Court, in its opinion, cited and noted with ap-
proval, and did not change or modify, the Lease lan-
guage requiring application of "sound accounting prin-
ciples" in calculating lease royalties. The opinion com-
mented favorably upon the procedures utilized by the 
parties prior to 1965, stating (30 Utah 2d at 9; R. 37): 
Thus, for about a quarter century and for about 
half of the life of the lease, by consent and un-
controverted ratification of four predecessor 
lessess not obiected to by the defendant as to 
method, the formula determining the 7% net 
profit rental was recognized by condescension 
and silence. 
I t was in keeping with this language that counsel 
for plaintiffs (1) withdrew their attempt to freeze the 
Exhibit 139-143 methodology into the Declaratory 
Judgment, (2) admitted that "what in effect the Court 
gave us by way of declaratory was that the method util-
ized prior to 1965 was the one that is proper under the 
lease" (emphasis added), and (3) sponsored the Judg-
ment language adopted by the Court below in its 
amended Order. 
The only explanation that we can find for the 
action of the Trial Judge in the case from which this 
appeal is taken is that he confused this Court's affirm-
ance of the money judgment with its reversal of the 
prospective declaratory judgment which was the sub-
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ject of McCarthy's admissions. In this regard, this 
Court stated (30 Utah 2d at 13; R. 40) : 
We conclude that the money judgment of the 
trial court be and it hereby is affirmed, as is the 
rest thereof, including that portion sustaining the 
accounting procedure reflected in Exhibits 139-
141, but excepting that portion of the 'require-
ments' portion of the lease discussed hereinabove 
[viz., original Finding 27 containing the required 
production level which is necessary in making 
the Ex. 139-141 computations]. That part is re-
versed with instructions to modify the same in 
consonance with the observations and opinion 
stated here. [Emphasis added] 
In the next paragraph of the opinion, this Court 
explained why "Finding 27" data, and hence Exhibits 
139-143, could be relied upon in the case before it as 
constituting the sole foundation for a money judgment 
for years prior to 1971 but could not stand prospectively 
for future years as part of the Declaratory Judgment. 
The reason stated by this Court was that the record 
presented a situation where the court found "evidence 
reasonably showing inaccessibility of records under the 
discovery process" for the prior period. 
Judge Tibbs apparently understood this distinction 
between the money judgment and declaratory judgment 
language in the Opinion of this Court when he entered 
the amendatory Order on remand, for the Order entered 
was consistent therewith. (R. 415) However, that dif-
ference later escaped him at trial and led him to the 
error here complained of. 
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By reason of the foregoing arguments and author-
ities, it is clear that defendant's proffers of proof at 
trial were relevant and admissible (1) under the Lease 
language, (2) under this Court's prior opinion and (3) 
under the specific language of the amending Order of 
the Trial Court. I t follows that the Trial Court erred 
and that the Judgment must be reversed. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D BY A D M I T -
T I N G I N C O M P E T E N T T E S T I M O N Y A N D 
D O C U M E N T A R Y E V I D E N C E OVER OBJEC-
T I O N AS TO P R O P E R A C C O U N T I N G PRO-
C E D U R E S A N D C O M P U T A T I O N S O F ROY-
A L T Y P A Y M E N T S C L A I M E D TO B E D U E 
U N D E R T H E L E A S E . 
The Trial Court erroneously received in evidence 
Exhibits 139A through 148A, together with the sup-
porting testimony of Mr. Caldwell, over objections of 
defendant that the same were not supported by proper 
foundation. (Tr. 45-49). The Trial Judge accepted 
plaintiff's fallacious argument that since the exhibits 
were identical to those received in evidence in the form-
er case, they were admissible in the latter. We submit 
that it is not that simple and that this evidence was not 
admissible, here in the absence of a necessary founda-
tional finding which the Court below cpuld not make 
(1) because of Mr, CaldwelPs admissions on cross ex-
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amination5 and (2) because the Court rejected all evi-
dence offered by defendant relating to the lack of found-
ation of Mr. Caldwell's evidence. 
In the prior case, Judge Erickson found on the 
basis of evidence before him that plaintiffs had sus-
tained their burden of proof to establish liability for 
years 1965-70 in that defendant had "departed from 
accounting procedures applied" by the parties prior to 
1965 and had not "carried on its business operations 
under the Lease in a prudent and businesslike manner 
for all interests concerned" during those years. 
He then turned to the question of damages and 
considered Exhibits 139-143 only because he found from 
the evidence before him for those years that defendant 
had not "maintained its books and records" in a man-
ner "which will permit a proper accounting of the net 
profit lease rentals due plaintiffs under the Lease". In 
affirming the use of that evidence in computing the 
money judgment, this Court likewise relied upon the 
foundational findings of the Court below showing "in-
accessibility of records" for those years. Such founda-
tional findings are not supportable on this record. Mr. 
Caldwell testified that the records of defendant were 
maintained in the same manner during 1971-73 as was 
the case in 1965-70. However, defendant offered to 
prove through its expert witness Fred Oliver, who had 
5 The specific disclosures drawn from Mr. Caldwell upon cross 
examination illuminating the lack of foundation in his evidence (Plaintiffs' only evidence), as well as the specific evidence 
offered by defendant independently establishing the lack of 
foundation in Mr. Caldwell's testimony have been cited earlier 
and are set forth in the Appendix attached hereto. 
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personally examined defendant's books and records cov-
ering years 1971-73, that every necessary record was 
available to compute net profit royalties in accordance 
with sound accounting principles and by the methods 
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in 
the years prior to 1965. (Tr. 111-112) His testimony, 
together with that of Glenn Wilson, if received, would 
have demonstrated the absolute falsity of each of the 
numerous factual assumptions made by plaintiffs' single 
witness. 
In addition, to the extent the "Caldwell evidence" 
is sought to be relied upon to establish liability in this 
case, plaintiffs will run afoul of Rule of Evidence No. 
19, adopted by this Court effective July 1, 1971. That 
rule provides that a witness must either have "personal 
knowledge" or "experience, training or education" re-
lating to "relevant or material matter". Mr. Caldwell 
conceded that he had neither personal knowledge nor 
did he have experience, training or education concern-
ing numerous of the matters involved. In the absence 
of such expertise, he admitted that he relied wholly 
upon assumptions or inferences of fact. Some of his 
specific admissions in this connection have been referred 
to earlier and are set forth in the Appendix attached 
hereto. This brings into play the doctrine enunciated in 
Jangulav. U.S. Rubber Co., 147 Mont, 98, 410 P.2d 
462, 467 (1966) in which the Montana Supreme Court 
stated as follows in holding erroneous the admission of 
expert medical testimony not supported by actual evi-
dence of facts which were assumed: 
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The rules relating to testimony of an expert wit-
ness have been set forth in Irion v. Hyde, 110 
Mont. 570, 105 P.2d 666. The expert must first 
testify to the facts within his own knowledge or 
based upon his observation upon which his opin-
ion is based. He must have the training and ex-
perience to draw a correct inference from facts 
outside of the range of the ordinary human ex-
perience. The judgment of an expert will not 
support the verdict when opposed by undisputed 
facts and the dictates of common sense. Where, 
as here, the conclusions of experts are based upon 
facts which do not exist, or are the result of an 
inference, admission over objection is erroneous. 
[Emphasis added] 
Here the so-called "evidence" is based upon a series 
of pyramided inferences concerning which Caldwell had 
neither knowledge nor experience. That alone would re-
quire rejection of the evidence under the Jangula doc-
trine and under the requirements of this Court's Rule 
of Evidence No. 19. However, the record now before 
us contains a much more compelling case for exclusion; 
this for the reason that through proffers of proof with 
respect to each and every "inference or assumption" re-
lied upon by Caldwell, persons with actual knowledge 
of those facts were prepared to testify that the infer-
ences and assumptions were false as a matter of fact. 
(See the attached Appendix) Since the Court below 
refused to consider these facts, the "summary judg-
ment" rules, discussed above, are here controlling. For 
the purposes of this appeal, the proffered testimony 
must be assumed to be true. Hence, the "undisputed 
facts", for purposes of this appeal, show that the con^ 
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elusions and opinions of Mr. Caldwell are based upon 
"facts" which "do not exist". I t follows that the "evi-
dence" sponsored by plaintiffs and received by the Court 
below is wholly without any foundation whatsoever. 
In short, on this record, one is left only with the un-
founded Caldwell testimony to establish the necessary 
foundational finding of "inaccessibility" of accounting 
records. That testimony was duly controverted by the 
defendant's offer of proof. In view of the genuine 
issues of fact thus resulting, the foundational finding 
cannot be made and this "evidence", bottomed as it is 
upon assumptions of fact admittedly beyond Caldwell's 
knowledge and beyond the field of his expertise, cannot 
stand. I t follows that the Judgment should be reversed. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N E N T E R -
I N G F I N D I N G S O F F A C T D E T E R M I N I N G 
SOUND A C C O U N T I N G P R O C E D U R E S A N D 
A C C O U N T I N G M E T H O D S U S E D BY T H E 
P A R T I E S P R I O R TO 1965 I N T H E A B S E N C E 
O F E V I D E N C E A N D C O N T R A R Y TO AD-
M I S S I B L E E V I D E N C E ON T H A T S U B J E C T 
O F F E R E D B Y D E F E N D A N T . 
The Trial Court made a specific finding (Findings 
of Fact, Para. 4; R. 103) that the plaintiffs' accounting 
testimony and exhibits received in evidence were in con-
formance with the "best and proper accounting pro-
cedure's] " for determining the royalties owing plain-
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tiffs and were "in accordance with the accounting meth-
ods employed by the parties prior to 1965". (R. 103) 
We concede that this would be a necessary finding to 
support a judgment for plaintiffs. However, it may 
not stand on this record. 
At trial, counsel for plaintiffs posed a question to 
Mr. Caldwell to elicit testimony that would support 
this finding. However, the question was withdrawn and 
not answered by the witness. (Tr. 73-74) 
Hence, there is no evidence of record whatever to 
support this finding. On the contrary, defendant of-
fered to call Mr, Fred Oliver to testify that plaintiffs' 
accounting was not in conformance with either sound 
accounting principles or with the accounting methods 
used by the parties prior to 1965. (Tr. 116) The Court 
erroneously rejected this testimony upon the ground 
that it is irrelevant. 
In summary, the only evidence offered below dem-
onstrates that the finding is erroneous. I t should be set 
aside and the Judgment should be reversed. 
P O I N T IV 
E A C H O F T H E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T 
A N D CONCLUSIONS O F L A W E N T E R E D BY 
T H E COURT B E L O W IS E R R O N E O U S AS A 
M A T T E R OF L A W A N D M U S T . BE SET 
A S I D E . 
We will not duplicate under this heading our vari-
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ous arguments above. However, we submit that each of 
the Findings of Fact of the Court below is unsupported 
by any competent evidence and is contrary to evidence 
properly proffered by defendant and erroneously re-
jected by thetrial Judge. We further submit that each 
of the Conclusions of Law is erroneous as a matter of 
law and that the Judgment entered thereon must be 
reversed. 
P O I N T V 
T H E J U D G M E N T W H I C H IS T H E SUB-
J E C T O F T H I S A P P E A L , I F S U S T A I N E D B Y 
T H I S COURT, W O U L D R E S U L T I N VIOLA-
T I O N OF D E F E N D A N T ' S R I G H T S TO D U E 
PROCESS AS P R O T E C T E D BY B O T H S T A T E 
A N D F E D E R A L C O N S T I T U T I O N S . 
For the numerous reasons stated above, this Court 
should never reach this argument. However, we invite 
the attention of this Court to the fact that the Judgment 
below, if affirmed, would violate both procedural and 
substantive due process as protected by both State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
First, the Court below arbitrarily rejected all of 
the evidence proffered by defendant, all of which was 
relevant and admissible. This was an effective denial 
to be heard and to present evidence, each of which was 
violative of procedural due process. In Republic Na-
tional Bank of Dallas v. Crippen, 224 F.2d 565 (5th 
Cir. 1955), the court held that the trial court's refusal 
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to allow appellants to introduce any evidence in sup-
port of their claims denied them a right to a hearing, 
which was a denial of due process. The court stated in 
this connection at page 566: 
The right to be heard on their claims was a con-
stitutional right and the denial of that right to 
them was a denial of due process which is never 
harmless error. [Citations omitted] 
In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 23 L.Ed. 2d 
404, 89 S.Ct. 1843 (1969), Mr. Justice Marshall, speak-
ing for the United States Supreme Court, stated the 
applicable rule where a party is deprived of his right 
to present evidence as follows (23 L.Ed. 2d at 421): 
The right to present evidence is, of course, essen-
tial to the fair hearing required by the due pro-
cess clause. See e.g., Morgan v. United States, 
supra, at 18, 82 L.Ed, at 1132; Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 
349, 368-69, 80 L.Ed. 1209? 1223, 1224, 56 S.Ct. 
797 (1936). 
Second, affirmance of the Judgment below would 
also result in the taking of valuable property interests 
of defendant without due process of law. I t is clear, as 
stated in Forde L. Johnson Oil Co. v. H. F. Johnson 
Oil Co., 372 P.2d 135, 137 (Ida. 1962) by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, that ~ 
The right to make contracts is both a liberty and 
a right, and is within the protection of the guar-
antee against the taking of liberty or property 
without due process . . . 
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Defendant here has possessed a valuable contract 
right in the form of the Fifty-Year Lease Agreement 
for nearly thirty years. As noted by Judge Henroid in 
the prior opinion of this Court, a "formula" had been 
followed by the parties in interpreting the provisions of 
that lease for "about a quarter century." The Judg-
ment appealed from makes a radical and arbitrary de-
parture from that "formula." The result robs defendant 
of its bargain, and takes and confiscates its property, 
all without due process. 
In the landmark case of Chicago, Burlington <§ 
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
41 L.Ed. 979, 985 (1897), Mr. Justice Harlan noted 
that rights secured by the 14th Amendment are pro-
tected against acts of "all instrumentalities of the state," 
including its "judicial authorities." He then stated: 
The mere form of the proceeding instituted 
against the owner even if he be admitted to de-
fend cannot convert the process used into due 
process of law, if the necessary result would be 
to deprive him of his property without just com-
pensation. 
We submit that the necessary result of affirming 
the Judgment below with its wholly arbitrary and crit-
ical impact upon defendant would be to deprive it of 
its clear and long standing contract rights without due 
process. 
I t follows that the Judgment must be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For each of the numerous reasons stated above, it 
is clear that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment entered by the Court below are erroneous 
as a matter of fact and as a matter of law and cannot 
stand. We urge this Court to reverse the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K E I T H E. T A Y L O R 
of and for 
PARSONS, B E H L E & L A T I M E R 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411J 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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A P P E N D I X 
Defendant sets forth below some of the specific ad-
missions of Mr. Grant Caldwell, plaintiffs' accounting 
and only witness, disclosing the lack of foundation in 
his testimony. Also, some of the specific offers of evi-
dence made by defendant are enumerated, independent-
ly showing that Mr. Caldwell's testimony is lacking in 
foundation. 
1. Mr. Caldwell incorrectly assumed that the profit 
margins of the Sigurd plant for the years 1962-63 would 
have remained the same for the years 1971-73, taking 
into account inconsequential adjustments. (Tr. 77). 
In contravention of this assumption, defendant offered 
evidence that profit margins would be different because 
(a) the cost of production had increased (Tr. 103-104) 
and (b) the marketing price of gypsum board had not 
risen commensurately due in part to the rules and regu-
lations of the Federal Government imposing the price 
freeze of 1971-73. (Tr. 100-101). Specifically, defend-
ant offered proof that profit margins did not remain 
constant over the years but in fact that the profit mar-
gins narrowed subsequent to 1962-64. (Tr. 104). 
2. Mr. Caldwell's assumptions did not take into 
consideration the actual cost increase per unit of gyp-
sum wallboard betwreen the years 1963 through 1964, 
on the one hand, and the years 1971 through 1973, on 
the other; in fact, he assumed that per unit costs re-
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mained the same. (Tr. 89-90) However, defendant made 
an offer of proof that the cost of production at the 
sigurd plant increased by $3,00 per 1,000 square feet 
between the period 1962-64 and 1971-73. This increase 
would have resulted in a profit decline of $400,000 per 
year and a decline of over $28,000 per year royalties 
owing plaintiffs. (Tr. 103-104) 
3. Mr, Caldwell's assumptions did not take into 
consideration the Federally imposed rules and regula-
tions limiting the price at which gypsum wallboard 
could be sold between the years 1971 and 1973. Mr. 
Caldwell stated he failed to do so because he did not 
believe that the price freeze had any substantial effect 
upon the price at which wallboard produced at the Sig-
urd plant could be sold between the years 1971 to 1973. 
(Tr. 90). In direct contravention of this testimony, de-
fendant offered proof that the price freeze did in fact 
affect and limit the price at which gypsum wallboard 
could be sold by the defendant. (Tr. 100-102) 
4. Mr. Caldwell chose as his base period, 1962 
through 1964, the years of the highest profit margins 
on the sale of gypsum products he could find from the 
defendant's records he examined. (Tr. 78). Moreover, 
defendant proffered evidence that Mr. Caldwell's base 
period was the most profitable period in the entire his-
tory of the Sigurd plant. (Tr. 105) 
5. Mr. Caldwell erroneously assujned that the Sig-
urd plant operated at a level of production for the ye^rs 
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1971 through 1973 the same as that for the years 1965 
through 1967. (Tr. 80). The truth is, and defendant 
offered evidence of the same at page 105 of the trans-
cript, that the years 1965-1967 were the years of high-
est production in the history of the Sigurd plant. 
6. Mr. Caldwell used as his base the marketing 
area in the Eastern United States, as opposed to that 
in the Western States where the Sigurd products are 
actually marketed, because he erroneously assumed that 
the Lovell and Acme plants of Georgia-Pacific had 
artificially reduced the market price in the West. (Tr. 
83-85, 88) In direct contravention, defendant proffered 
evidence that the Acme plant did not ship any gypsum 
products into the Sigurd marketing area during the 
years 1971-73. (Tr. 102-103) Moreover, Mr. Caldwell 
made his assumptions even though he performed no mar-
keting or economic studies to determine the actual cause 
for the price decline in the Sigurd market for the years 
1971 through 1973. (Tr. 85-86). In further contraven-
tion of Mr. Caldwell's testimony, defendant proffered 
testimony of Mr. Glenn E. Wilson, Vice-President of 
Georgia-Pacific Corporation in charge of gypsum oper-
ations, that Mr. Caldwell's assumption was false, and 
that in fact defendant's market share in the West in the 
years 1971 to 1973 was much less than the market share 
in the United States generally and in the Eastern mar-
kets in particular. (Tr. 103). Additionally, defendant 
offered proof that Mr. Caldwell's assumption, that the 
Sigurd plant's market area, the Western United States, 
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behaved the same as the market area in the rest of the 
United States, is incorrect. Mr. Wilson would have 
testified that this is not true, and that in fact the two 
markets have behaved quite differently. (Tr. 104). 
7. Significantly, Mr. Caldwell made his assump-
tions though he is not an expert in marketing gypsum 
products and though he is not an expert in the economics 
of the gypsum industry as applied to the Sigurd plant. 
Mr. Caldwell acknowledged that his expertise was lim-
ited to accounting. (Tr. 77) Defendant, on the other 
hand, was prepared to introduce the testimony of indi-
viduals having expertise in the economics and marketing 
of gypsum products. (Tr. 107-108). 
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